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Early in the nation's history, American judges often examined
the legal precedents of foreign courts to guide the development of
domestic common law. Over time, as American legal culture grew
to become more robust and distinctive, American courts' reliance
on foreign common law waned.' As modern technology and communication have increased the pace of globalization, however, the
relationship between American and foreign law has grown closer
once again. Consequently, American courts now find themselves
in the midst of new debates over matters related to international
and foreign law. Some disputes arise over the extent to which
international law constrains American action2 and others over the
proper role of analyzing, applying, and referring to foreign legal
principles in order to guide evolving American legal standards.
Notwithstanding the interesting and important issues involved in
such debates, this note focuses on the narrow question of how far
American courts ought to extend the extraterritorial reach of
domestic criminal law in order to punish certain criminal behavior
that has negligible or nonexistent effects upon American interests.
Specifically, this note questions the wisdom of continuing the
practice of using the American wire fraud statute to prosecute
attempts to violate foreign tax laws. The introduction in Part I of
1. See The Insidious Wiles of Foreign Influence, THE
at 25.
2. See, e.g. THE

NATIONAL

SECURITY

ECONOMIST,

STRATEGY OF

THE

June 11, 2005,

UNITED

STATES

OF

at 31 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf ("We will
take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security
commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for
investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC),
whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.").
3. Compare Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005) (Kennedy, J.)
(recognizing that the United States Supreme Court "has referred to the laws of other
countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments'"), with Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Tihis Court ...should
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.").
AMERICA,

2005].

THE PASQUANTINO PLEA

199

this note will describe the factual and legal background of a recent
case involving two brothers who sought to evade Canadian taxes
by smuggling alcohol from America across the Canadian border.
Part II of this article will examine the trend in academic commentary that criticizes the revenue rule, a common law principle that
has played a subtle but important role in protecting domestic and
foreign interests by prohibiting the use of the American criminal
code to enforce foreign tax law. This part will also include a
defense of the revenue rule with regard to its application in the
Pasquantinoline of cases. Part III will consider why using the
wire fraud statute is a particularly inappropriate strategy to
extend the jurisdiction of American courts into the realm of foreign law. A brief conclusion will appear in Part IV.
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Factual Background: The Pasquantinos'Scheme

To the Pasquantino brothers, of Niagara Falls, New York,4
the Canadian Parliament's passage of a new sin tax on alcohol
sold within its borders presented an opportunity to make some
money. Recognizing that they could turn a profit by smuggling
large quantities of American liquor over the Canadian border and
selling it on the Canadian black market, David and Carl Pasquantino settled on establishing a criminal enterprise to do just that.
From 1996 to 2000, the Pasquantinos made telephone calls from
their New York residence to various Maryland liquor stores in
order to arrange high-quantity purchases of alcohol, which they
would transport to New York and smuggle into Canada to avoid
paying Canadian taxes.' Once the alcohol was in Canada, they
were able to sell it at a substantial profit.6
The Pasquantinos' scheme to avoid Canadian sin taxes on certain goods (like alcohol and tobacco products) by smuggling them
from the United States was anything but novel,7 and was uncovered by an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol
Tobacco and Firearms and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.'
4. United States v. Pasquantino (Pasquantino1), 305 F.3d 291, 293 (4th Cir.
2002).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 293-94.
7. See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997); Attorney General of
Canada v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. (Reynolds 1), 103 F. Supp. 2d 134
(N.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).
8. PasquantinoI, 305 F.3d at 293.
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The Pasquantinos and their associates were arrested and indicted
for tax violations in Canada.9 While the Pasquantinos might have
expected to be charged in Canadian courts for evading the payment of Canadian taxes, they must have been surprised to find
themselves also facing indictments filed by United States prosecutors for violations of American law. By virtue of their interstate
telephone calls to Maryland liquor stores in furtherance of their
fraudulent scheme to evade Canadian excise taxes, the Pasquantinos had wandered within the expansive realm of the American
wire fraud statute. Colorfully nicknamed by commentators
because of its comprehensive coverage of almost all criminal (or
potentially criminal) activity, 1° the federal wire fraud statute" and
its cousin, the federal mail fraud statute, 2 are powerful
prosecutorial weapons that criminalize the transmission of any
"communication in interstate commerce.., for the purpose of executing" a fraudulent scheme.1" The language, history, and interpretation of the mail fraud statute and the wire fraud statute are
sufficiently similar that the two statutes have been treated interchangeably
numerousthis
decisions,"
as well as in accompanying
commentary,inincluding
note.

B.

ProceduralHistory: The PasquantinoCases

Though the Pasquantinos were convicted initially in federal
district court, their convictions were overturned by a three-judge
panel of the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in PasquantinoI." The panel decision held that the revenue rule, a com9. Id. at 293 n.4.
10. See, e.g., Bradley R. Wilson, Subtle Indiscretions? InternationalSmuggling,
FederalCriminal Law, and the Revenue Rule, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 231, 231, 231 n.1,
232 (2003) (referring to "the 'Colt .45' of the federal prosecutor" because of its
"'simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity"' (citing Jed. S. Rakoff, The
Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980)); Ellen S.
Podgor, Mail Fraud: Redefining the Boundaries, 10 ST. THoMAs L. REV. 557, 558
(1998) (referring to the mail fraud statute as "the prosecutor's 'Uzi,'" noting a similar
referral to the statute as "the prosecutor's 'Stradivarius"' (citing Rakoff, supra, at
771), and comparing it to "'hydrogen bombs on stealth aircraft"' (citing Ralph K.
Winter, PayingLawyers, Empowering Prosecutors,and ProtectingManagers:Raising
the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DuKE L.J. 954, 954 (1993))).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2004).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2004).
14. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987); United States v.
Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1088 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 194
(3d Cir. 1998).
15. PasquantinoI, 305 F.3d 291, 292 (4th Cir. 2002).
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mon law principle that precludes American courts from
recognizing or enforcing foreign law, including tax judgments,
applied to the Pasquantinos' scheme to use interstate telephone
wires to avoid foreign taxes, and placed16 it beyond the reach of the
American criminal wire fraud statute.
However, in an en banc decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the panel decision made in PasquantinoI and affirmed the Pasquantinos' convictions.' The en banc decision in PasquantinoII
gave rise to a circuit split regarding the proper scope of the extraterritorial effect of the American wire fraud statute.
The Supreme Court granted certiorarito resolve the conflict
among the circuits, and, in a decision written by Justice Thomas,
adopted the expansive interpretation of the wire fraud statute
favored by the Fourth Circuit in Pasquantino 1.18 The Supreme
Court's expansion of the wire fraud statute's extraterritorial
effect, contrary to legislative intent, simultaneously tramples
traditional notions of foreign sovereignty and threatens domestic
American interests while increasing the complexity and exacerbating competing tensions in American jurisprudence.' 9

II.

THE REVENUE RULE

The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations reflects an
axiom derived from common law that "[c]ourts in the United
States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgements for
the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of
other states."2 ° Critics have characterized the revenue rule as a
relic that does not properly recognize the interdependence
between America and foreign nations in light of modern advancements in global communication, transportation, and diplomacy.
Commentators have claimed that it harms American and foreign
interests alike, and that it is either invalid or has been improperly
applied by judges who rely on it to support their rulings.2 ' Such
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 295-96.
United States v. Pasquantino (Pasquantino11), 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003).
Pasquantino v. United States (PasquantinoIII), 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1781 (2005).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 483 (1987); See, e.g., Attorney

General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. (Reynolds II), 268 F.3d 103
(2d Cir. 2001); Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163
(9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing the revenue rule in an international context); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448-49 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 10; Joseph M. West, Federal FraudProsecutions
of Schemes to Defraud Foreign Sovereigns of Import Taxes, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1061

202

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

arguments are misguided.
A.

Divining Legislative Intent

The role of American courts is to interpret the will of the Legislature. By discarding the revenue rule absent a clear manifestation of congressional intent to abandon it, the Supreme Court
overstepped its constitutional mandate.
1.

The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

American courts review legislation "against the backdrop of
the presumption against extraterritoriality." 22 Additionally,
American courts are most vigilant in their protection of common
law principles without explicit legislative direction to the contrary
"when an interpretation of a broad, general statute would implicate foreign relations."23 As it is applied in the Pasquantinocases,
the wire fraud statute is interpreted broadly to criminalize activity in furtherance of a scheme, successful or not, to evade foreign
taxes, and thus, self-evidently meets the standard of a broad statute involving foreign relations.
2.

The Common Law Background

To be sure, Congress is not obligated to ensure that its statutory enactments comport in lockstep fashion with existing common law. However, American courts are loath to assume that the
legislature intends to contradict common law by mere implication.
Rather, when faced with a legislative act that appears to contradict common law, courts approach the question of whether Congress intended to supercede common law by presuming that the
Legislature acted "against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles." 24 The presumption in favor of upholding established common law principles is especially stringent with regard
(2004); William J. Kovatch, Jr., Article, Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An
Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 265 (2000).
22. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co. 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1752, 1755 (2005)).
23. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 128 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963)).
24. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solomino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); see also
Pasquantino11, 336 F.3d 321, 338 (4th Cir. 2003) (Gregory, C.J., dissenting); United
States v. Boots, 80 F.3d. 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996).
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to statutes that have an expansive scope. 25 The wire fraud statute, which criminalizes behavior that is indicative of a mere intent
to deceive, could hardly be more expansive. Consequently, it
would seem to require a clear and unambiguous statement of legislative intent to pass the demanding judicial scrutiny necessary
to abrogate the revenue rule and thereby convict the Pasquantino
defendants, who were charged with violating a statute which was
not only broad but also implicated matters related to foreign
affairs.2"
However, the closest thing to a clear statement in favor of the
legislature's intent to abrogate the revenue rule that Justice
Thomas was able to find is the wire fraud statute's application to
frauds "executed 'in interstate or foreign commerce.'"27 Despite
Justice Thomas's assertion that Congress used such language to
indicate that it had more than just "domestic concerns in mind""8
in enacting the wire fraud statute, that provision is ostensibly
boilerplate language in furtherance of establishing federal jurisdiction. It is not a statement intended to express a congressional
preference concerning a controversial and complicated common
law principle.2 9 In fact, Justice Ginsburg's dissent points out that
a clearer legislative statement is required before the Court may
abrogate the revenue rule: "A statute's express application to acts
committed in foreign commerce, the Courthas repeatedly held,
does not in itself indicate a congressional design to give the statute extraterritorial effect."30
In sum, the most logical interpretation of the legislative
intent motivating the expansion of the wire fraud statute to all
frauds executed "in interstate or foreign commerce" would simply
underscore Congress's commitment to extend American courts'
extraterritorial jurisdiction to criminal activity that carries some
threat of actual harm to American commerce, even when such
activity takes place outside of the United States. But, it does not
25. See Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 128 (citing, inter alia, Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 21-23 (1999)).
26. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
27. Pasquantino III, 125 S. Ct. at 1781 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1343).
28. Id. (citing Small v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1752, 1752 (2005)).
29. A WestLaw search of the United States Code containing the phrase "in
interstate or foreign commerce" returns 335 results, a sum that suggests such
language is too ordinary and commonplace in federal legislation to constitute a clear
and specific legislative intent to abrogate a common law principle by giving
extraterritorial effect to a broad, general statute.
30. PasquantinoIII, 125 S.Ct. at 1785 n.7 (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250-53 (1991)).
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necessarily follow that the legislature also intended to settle a
complex debate involving controversial notions of international
relations, universal jurisdiction, and conflicts of law by expanding
the scope of the wire fraud statute to cases that involve the
enforcement of foreign revenue law simply by including run-ofthe-mill language that has the oblique effect of applying the wire
3 1
fraud statute to schemes that violate foreign tax laws.
3.

Legislative Inaction

Congress has demonstrated its willingness to expand the
scope of legislation that it concludes courts have interpreted too
narrowly. For example, the Supreme Court, in McNally v. United
States, held that Congress did not intend to include the "intangible right" to honest services as a property right covered by the
wire fraud statute.2 Congress responded to the Court's overly
restrictive interpretation of the intended scope of the wire fraud
statute less than one year later by enacting legislation that explicitly included the deprivation of a victim's "intangible right" of honest services as a component of a "scheme or artifice to defraud"
under the statute.3 3 Despite the longstanding division among federal courts with regard to the proper scope of the wire fraud statute's application to schemes intended to evade foreign taxes,
Congress has not addressed the issue in a way that even
approaches the degree of clarity that it demonstrated in its
response to the McNally decision. In fact, Congress has approved
narrowly tailored bilateral and multilateral smuggling and tax
assistance treaties with foreign nations to deal with such sensitive
matters of foreign relations, avoiding the need to give the wire
4
fraud statute such an expansive scope by way of judicial fiat.3
Rather than pointing to a clear legislative statement in favor
of abrogating the revenue rule (which does not exist), those in
favor of following that course instead insist that the revenue rule,
even if applied to the Pasquantinos' scheme, would not have prevented its prosecution under the wire fraud statute. For instance,
Judge Hamilton's majority opinion in PasquantinoII traces the
creation of the revenue rule to two eighteenth century English
cases and concludes on the basis of those cases that the revenue
31. Cf. Russell J. Davis, ExtraterritorialApplication of FederalAntitrust Laws to
Acts Occurring in Foreign Commerce, 40 A.L.R. FED. 343, § 2 (2004).
32. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2005).
34. See also discussion infra Part II.B.4.
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rule was "pure and simple dicta" and did not constitute "binding
authority in American jurisprudence."3 5 In similar fashion, Justice Thomas finds that the revenue rule originally barred the
direct collections of foreign tax obligations. 6 He concludes that
because the modern incarnation of the revenue rule has derogated
from its original roots, it should no longer be applied to prohibit
37
what he regards as indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws.
These arguments are misguided because they seize upon the
uncontroverted conclusion that the revenue rule's history in early
English cases and its inclusion in the Restatement does not constitute authority to bind American courts as a matter of law. It subtly distracts from the fact that congressional notice of the revenue
rule, not its binding force as legal authority, is relevant in assessing its vitality in modern American law. Since the revenue rule
was established in the eighteenth century, it has been interpreted
in both foreign and domestic litigation and it has been the focus of
academic commentary. Such extensive treatment is sufficient to
give rise to at least a presumption of congressional awareness of
the revenue rule's existence as a common law principle. Consequently, American courts should demand a clear statement of legislative intent to abrogate the revenue rule before entertaining
prosecutions that contradict its mandate.
Nevertheless, the Court argues that the revenue rule did not
clearly apply to the type of criminal activity at issue in Pasquantino III at the time that the legislature passed the wire fraud statute in 1952."1 The Court concludes that the Congress which
passed the wire fraud statute in 1952 would not have expected the
revenue rule to constrain such prosecutions,3 9 so the revenue rule
will not bar the Pasquantinos' convictions in 2005. However, the
Court overestimates the prerequisites that are necessary to establish the prominence of a common law principle at the time that a
potentially superceding statute is enacted in order for the common
law principle to persist.
First, the authorities cited by the Court in support of its
exacting proposition are not particularly consistent. For example,
the Court defines the test as one that requires a finding that "the
common-law revenue rule clearly barred such a prosecution" in
35. Pasquantino1I, 336 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Holman v. Johnson,
98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775); Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B. 1779)).
36. Pasquantino11, 336 F.3d at 329.
37. Id.; PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1777-78 (2005).
38. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. at 1776.
39. See id. at 1766-67.
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the year the wire fraud statute was enacted.4" The Court requires
that the common law principle have a "well-settled meaning" in
order to meet its test.4 However, the precedent cited in support of
that test would require that "the statute. .. 'speak directly' to the
question addressed by the common law;"4 2 or that the "commonlaw principle [be] well established."' First, in this context, the
wire fraud statute does not "speak directly" to the question
addressed by the common law revenue rule. Second, well-established principle is not necessarily one that has a well-settled
meaning, though the Court seems to equate the two. Moreover,
the revenue rule could well be considered a well-established principle with some inconsistent interpretations concerning its function at the margins. Thus, the government's position in
PasquantinoIII would appear to fail on both levels. However, by
interpreting the precedent as requiring that the common law principle in question be "well-settled" in addition to "well-established,"
Justice Thomas changes the test midstream and effectively lowers
the burden on the government to prove that the Legislature
intended to abrogate the common law revenue rule by enacting
the wire fraud statute.
Second, although the Court cites precedent suggesting that
the common law must have "clearly barred such a prosecution,"4 4
it does not explain how to balance such strict rules of historical
analysis with the equally strict rules of statutory interpretation
that discourage an assumption of extraterritoriality. In other
words, the Court succeeds in identifying stringent requirements
that must be met before a common law principle will deemed relevant to the application of a subsequent legislative enactment, but
it does not justify why the mere existence of a controversy over the
exact scope of the revenue rule should negate each and every
demanding rule of statutory construction that impels a strong presumption against such a broad interpretation of extraterritorial
legislative enactments.
Although the relevant period for determining the legislative
intent of a statute is formally limited to the date of the statute's
enactment, it should be noted that Congress has seen fit to amend
the wire fraud statue at least five times since its enactment in
40. Id. at 1774.
41. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1999).
42. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
43. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
44. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. at 1774 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 22-23).
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1952, never once signaling that it intended to settle what had
become an increasingly prominent and controversial debate in
favor of abrogating the revenue rule.4" Congress, if it wishes, may
definitively assert the scope of the wire fraud statute. The Court
should not take it upon itself to fill the void of legislative silence
here.
B.

Policy ConsiderationsAdvanced by the Revenue
Rule

Arguments in favor of recognizing the revenue rule's constraint upon the wire fraud statute's scope cannot stand on statutory construction alone. Legitimate and substantive legislative
policy is advanced by recognizing the vitality of the revenue rule.
Without it, American courts face the tripartite danger of breeding
inconsistency and confusion with regard to the interpretation of
domestic laws and multilateral treaties; overburdening domestic
courts; and provoking foreign nations, including even those whose
tax laws it seeks to enforce.
1.

In General: Preventing Inconsistent Evaluation of
Foreign Law

Courts that choose to ignore the revenue rule, despite legislative intent to the contrary, embark upon a path that impels them
to practice de facto foreign diplomacy from the bench, a task that
American judges are not competent to undertake. Judge Calabresi, a Second Circuit judge, considers the "difficulty involved in
figuring out the meaning and significance of some foreign laws especially tax laws" to be the only germane argument in favor of
recognizing the revenue rule.4" Judge Learned Hand suggested
this argument in Moore v. Mitchell, a domestic revenue rule case."
Unfortunately, Judge Calabresi takes the wind out of Judge
Hand's formulation of the rule by characterizing it as a reaction to
the "practical obstacle"" of comprehending the meaning of com45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2005) (amended 1956, 1989, 1990, 1994, 2002); see also
Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d 103, 127 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The Senate itself has, through its
actions, shown respect for the revenue rule.") (citing 147 Cong. Rec. S2511 (daily ed.
March 19, 2001) (referring to S.420)); discussion infra Part II.A.3.
46. To be fair to Judge Calabresi, the full quotation cited in the text refers to the
"alleged difficulty involved in figuring out the meaning of some foreign laws .... "
Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 137 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
47. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring).
48. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 137 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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plex foreign law.49 While Judge Calabresi is correct in concluding
that issues of interpretation may arise when American courts recognize or enforce complex foreign laws - especially tax laws his analysis does not tell the whole story. Judge Hand does not
believe that tax laws are particularly prone to misapplication by
foreign courts on the basis of competence alone. 50
The underpinning to Judge Hand's concurrence in Moore is
more nuanced than Judge Calabresi recognizes. Judge Hand
observed that courts in one jurisdiction are ill-equipped to balance
the cultural sentiments, ideological leanings, and political interests that were involved in shaping the laws of another.5 1 His
admonition that a court in one state should not "undertake an
inquiry which it cannot prosecute without determining whether
[another state's] laws are consonant with its own notions of what
is proper"5 2 takes on even greater meaning in an international
context where notions of propriety are likely to be more disparate
between nations than they would be between states.
Judge Hand's concern is not merely academic. The decision to
embark on an inquiry of foreign law obligates an American court
to consider the foreign law in comparison to its own values, sensitivities, and priorities. 3 As a practical matter, American courts
will not only inevitably retreat away from enforcing and recognizing foreign laws that they are not capable of comprehending (as
Judge Calabresi notes), but also foreign laws that the judges on
those courts find odious. Differences with regard to personal opinions are likely to result in inconsistency with regard to judicial
49. Judge Calabresi assuages his own concern on this point in a footnote, resolving
that, "[tihe argument is, to put it mildly, dubious in a global economy, which requires
a great amount of interpretation of foreign laws." Id. at 138 n.4. But he ignores the
fact that, in situations where Congress intends for American courts to pass on
complex areas of foreign law, Congress provides safeguards to guide American courts.
As regards foreign tax law in particular, statutes like the Anti-Smuggling Law, 18
U.S.C. § 546 (2005), include reciprocity provisions that signal a specific legislative
intent for courts to analyze those foreign laws by utilizing the direct American
analogue as a tool to guide their interpretation. The wire fraud statute offers no such
protection.
50. Moore, 30 F.2d 600 (Hand, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 604.
52. Id.
53. See Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 111 ("[T]ax laws embody a sovereign's political
will. They create property rights and affect each individual's relationship to his or

her sovereign. They mirror the moral and social sensibilities of a society. Sales taxes,
for example, may enforce political and moral judgements about certain products.
Import and export taxes may reflect a country's ideological leaning and the political
goals of its commercial relationships with other nations."); see also Moore, 30 F.2d at
604.
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opinions. The sin taxes at issue in the Pasquantino cases are a
paradigmatic example of a type of foreign law that is particularly
reflective of a foreign country's political goals, social ideology, and
policy preferences.5 4 Courts that ignore the revenue rule run the
risk of "becoming ensnared in the difficult decisions concerning
55
which foreign laws [American courts] will help to enforce."
In earlier cases before American courts, the Canadian government had pursued civil claims based on American law against
defendants in an effort to recover damages arising from smuggling
operations similar to the one undertaken by the Pasquantinos. At
least one commentator, arguing that the revenue rule should not
apply to bar such claims under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) has said that, "[iut seems likely that
Canada would be . . .offended by the dismissal of its apparently
viable RICO claim."56 In cases where American prosecutors and
American courts indirectly vindicate foreign sovereigns' interests
in enforcing foreign tax laws by prosecuting violators under the
wire fraud statute, inconsistent patterns of enforcement will constitute an even greater affront to the foreign governments whose
laws are not given effect in American courts.
For example, assuming that the foreclosure of Canada's civil
RICO action in the preceding hypothetical scenario is offensive to
the Canadian government, opponents of the revenue rule fail to
account for the indignation that India would express in the likely
event that smugglers of Christian bibles into India are not pursued by American judges and prosecutors with the same zeal as
smugglers of alcohol into Canada. 7 The nature of the legislative
54. In its complaint in Reynolds II, the Canadian government described the
motivation behind the enactment of its sin tax on cigarettes as an effort, "[t]o protect
its youth from the health hazards of smoking, and to implement anti-tobacco
programs and other public benefits . . . [The tax increases] held the promise of
deterring young people from becoming addicted to a harmful drug . . . [and]
encouraging established smokers to quit." Reynolds 1I, 268 F.3d at 113. Whatever
one makes of the wisdom and beneficence of the Canadian tobacco excise tax in
particular, it does not call into question the primarily regulatory nature of the tax
hike and its sensitive moral and political undertones, a fact that might be more
apparent with regard to foreign excise taxes on other items. See infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
55. PasquantinoI, 305 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2002).
56. Elizabeth J. Farnam, Note & Comment, Racketeering,RICO and the Revenue
Rule in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds: Civil RICO Claims for Foreign
Tax Law Violations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 843, 869 (2002).
57. See Pasquantino 1, 305 F.3d at 297 ("[Ilmagine that Canada imposed an
import duty on bibles, and appellants schemed to smuggle bibles rather than liquor.
The revenue rule was created in part to avoid these types of political and foreign
policy-based determinations.").
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branch's constitutional mandate to establish policy and the executive branch's mandate to enforce it allows a certain degree of
inconsistent application. The judicial branch, however, nurtures a
tradition of fostering consistency - embodied in its adherence to
common law principles like stare decisis - that does not allow it to
manage complicated matters that implicate foreign relations as
well as the executive and legislative branches do. Surely, American courts encourage international disdain to the extent that they
invite inconsistent results based on cultural and ideological leanings rather than objective legal reflection. "Safety" from the contempt that inherently inconsistent enforcement and recognition of
foreign law that American courts will inevitably attract from foreign governments "lies only in universal rejection." 8
2.

Domestic Considerations
a.

Respecting the Separation of Powers

In his opinion for the Court, Justice Thomas advances a
related yet subtle reformulation of Judge Hand's concern with
regard to American courts' evaluation of foreign law. Justice
Thomas agrees that "the principal evil against which the revenue
rule was traditionally thought to guard [is] judicial evaluation of
the policy-laden enactments of other sovereigns."5 9 Unlike Judge
Calabresi, who focuses on the risks inherent in angering third
parties as a result of inconsistent judgments touching on matters
of foreign law, Justice Thomas concerns himself with the danger
that friction will arise as a direct result of the embarrassment felt
by the nation whose laws the American court attempts to interpret. He cites the broad grant of authority the executive branch
enjoys in managing matters of international relations. ° Because
the prosecutor represents the executive branch in wire fraud prosecutions arising from foreign tax evasion schemes, he concludes
that the danger of causing international friction is of little
concern.
The Court's logic is seductive, but misleading. Prosecutions
under the wire fraud statute for violations of foreign tax law are
not equivalent to the species of activity for which the Constitution
has granted "plenary and exclusive power" to the executive
58. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2001).
59. PasquantinoIIl, 125 S.Ct. 1776, 1779 (2005).
60. Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936)); see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 76869 (1972).

2005]

THE PASQUANTINO PLEA

211

branch. 1 In fact, the passage from United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp. that the majority cites in support of its conclusion is immediately preceded by the admonition that, "[i]t is
important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with
an authority vested in the [executive branch] by an exertion of legislative power."62 Thus, the majority's argument puts the cart
before the horse because it depends on the assumption that Congress granted the executive branch the authority to initiate criminal wire fraud prosecutions for schemes intended to violate
foreign law by abrogating the revenue rule, which it did not." The
issues at play in cases that involve wire fraud prosecutions for
schemes intended to violate foreign tax law are characteristic of
matters that the Constitution demands the approval of both the
executive and legislative branches,'"to the exclusion of other matters upon which the executive branch may act alone.65
Contrary to the implication apparent in the Court's decision,
extraterritorial criminal prosecutions must be authorized by a
grant of legislative power. When Congress intends to do so, it generally includes reference to foreign law as an element of the criminal offense rather than remaining silent on the matter and
leaving the question of extraterritorial application of American
criminal law to be resolved by prosecutorial discretion alone. 6
Eliminating the revenue rule does not comport with the inherent
legislative obligation to protect the domestic interests of ensuring
judicial economy and regulating commercial relations with foreign
nations. The involvement of the executive branch in a criminal
prosecution like Pasquantinomay, at best, alleviate some of the
concerns inherent in such a case assuming that the prosecution
was authorized by Congress. The executive branch cannot, however, justify the initiation of such a criminal proceeding without
the blessing of the legislature.
b.

FosteringJudicial Economy

One of the important responsibilities inherent in Congress's
obligation to establish laws is the preservation of American
courts. It is foolish to compound the well-documented problem of
61. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
62. Id. at 319-20.
63. See discussion supra Part II.A.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2.
65. Id. art. II, § 2.
66. See PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. 1776, 1785 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1); 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A)).
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overburdened federal dockets with cases that essentially give
effect to foreign law.17 The claim that abrogating the revenue rule
will result in a strain on American judicial resources only to the
extent that foreign nations will come to view American courts as
an attractive (or inexpensive) venue to enforce its revenue laws is
a misleading oversimplification because it suggests that the
"mere" recognition of foreign laws will not exacerbate the pressure
on American courts.
Most modern American courts have distinguished civil cases,
in which foreign governments essentially use American courts as
a venue to enforce foreign laws, from criminal prosecutions, like
the Pasquantinocases where an American prosecutor indirectly
enforces foreign law in American courts.6" In either case, however,
American courts experience a strain on already limited judicial
resources. The fact that the Canadian government has a chaperone in the form of a United States Attorney in cases like the Pasquantinos' neither substantially reduces the unwarranted
windfall that the Canadian government enjoys by enforcing its tax
laws in American courts, 9 nor does it substantially alleviate the
direct and indirect costs absorbed by the American legal system in
prosecuting actions that are, at their core, petitions for the
enforcement of foreign tax law.
3.

Foreign Sovereignty Considerations

Applying the criminal wire fraud statute in such a way as to
intrude into the operation of foreign tax laws carries a greater
danger to American interests beyond the mere burden that it
places on American courts. It carries the potential threat of
imposing unwelcome acts of interference that disturb the sovereign rights of foreign nations.

67. See Pasquantino1, 305 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2002) ("The revenue rule should
not be viewed as a means for guilty defendants to escape punishment, but rather it
should be seen as an important protection mechanism for our courts.").
68. See, e.g., Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d 103, 123 (2d Cir. 2001).
69. Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164-1165
(9th Cir. 1979); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964)
(White, J. dissenting) ("[O]ur courts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue and
penal laws of a foreign state, since no country has an obligation to further the
governmental interests of a foreign sovereign.").
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That Which We Call a Rose: The Illusory
Distinction Between Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Law in Domestic Courts

To address concerns that its broad interpretation of the wire
fraud statute would overburden American courts and threaten the
sovereignty of foreign nations, the PasquantinoII majority created two sterile conceptual distinctions to guide its analysis.
First, the Fourth Circuit majority dispenses with the concern
that their treatment of the wire fraud statute will result in a
windfall to Canada by establishing a fine distinction between the
impermissible enforcement of Canadian tax law and the permissible recognition of Canadian tax law in order to establish essential
elements of a criminal violation under American law.7" Reynolds
II is generally recognized as the paradigmatic example of a case
involving the impermissible enforcement of foreign law in American courts because a civil recovery would enrich the Canadian
treasury.7' Conversely, PasquantinoII, a criminal case, does not
raise similar disquiet among the Fourth Circuit majority because
a verdict against the Pasquantino defendants would not result in
any award to the Canadian government. However, any analysis
that focuses the distinction on the question of civil damages alone
ignores the windfall that Canada gains by enjoying the deterrent
effect of public enforcement of its revenue laws while her courts do
not bear the burden of adjudicating the action.
In essence, the Fourth Circuit majority establishes a strict
categorization schedule that identifies American judicial notice of
foreign law as occurring for the purposes of either direct enforcement of foreign law or recognition of foreign law to establish
American criminal liability. The revenue law, according to the
majority, only applies when American courts undertake to enforce
foreign law, but does not apply in cases where American courts
recognize foreign law for any other purpose. The majority emphasizes that a victory for the prosecution in this case "does nothing
civilly or criminally to enforce any tax judgments or claims that
the foreign sovereign has ...

against the defendant," signaling a

belief that the recognition and enforcement of foreign law are
mutually exclusive. 2 According to this logic, if an American court
70. Pasquantino11, 336 F.3d at 330; see also Wilson, supra note 10, at 250.
71. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 131 ("[Alt bottom, Canada would have a United States
court require defendants to reimburse Canada for its unpaid taxes . .

.

Canada's object is clearly to recover allegedly unpaid taxes.").
72. Pasquantino11, 336 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).

. Thus,
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"merely recognizes" foreign law, it therefore does not "enforce" foreign law; and if the court does not enforce foreign law, the revenue
rule is not implicated. The reality, of course, is not so simple.
Rather than doing nothing civilly or criminally to enforce Canadian law, American courts increase the deterrent effect of Canadian tax law by prosecuting its evasion under the wire fraud
statute while exerting a strain on domestic judicial resources and
raising potential instances of American interference with Canadian sovereignty.
As the dissent notes, the majority's hermetic analysis renders
the revenue rule effectively irrelevant, because it narrows the
application of the revenue rule only "to those rare instances in
which a court is compelled to actually enforce the judgement of a
foreign court." 3 The majority is quick to assuage this concern by
constructing its second false partition between the enforcement
(or recognition) of foreign judgments, which it considers to still be
barred by the revenue rule, on one hand; and the enforcement (or
recognition) of foreign law on the other.74 Under this logic, the
revenue rule would function to prevent American courts from
being used to effectuate final judgements of foreign courts, but
American courts could nonetheless make rulings that enforce the
substantive laws of a foreign government and recognize aspects of
foreign substantive law for the purposes of establishing elements
of American law.
The Supreme Court starts on the right path by acknowledging
the difficulty of drawing "the line between an issue involving
merely recognition of a foreign law and indirect enforcement of
it." 5 Surprisingly, however, it does not regard the inability of
American courts to make principled distinctions about the scope of
the wire fraud statute's application as a problem deserving its
concern. Rather, in a remarkable display of misdirection, the
Court uses the haziness as an example of the revenue rule's uncertain application in support of its proposition that it was not a sufficiently well-established principle at the time of the wire fraud
statute's enactment to merit legislative incorporation of the doctrine." In other words, it emphasizes the opacity of the distinction
between enforcement and recognition as it applies to the interpre73. Id. at 338 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
74. PasquantinoH, 336 F.3d at 328.
75. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1779 (2005) (citing A.
CONFLICT OF LAWS 90 (L. Collins gen. ed., 13th ed. 2000)).
76. Id.

DICEY & J. MORRIS,
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tation of the revenue rule in the minds of those in the 1952 Congress and minimizes the import that the unclear line between
enforcement and recognition carries in present practice.7 The
Court does not address the practical effects of authorizing American courts to enforce foreign law where such enforcement is a necessary consequence of recognizing foreign law for the purpose of
prosecuting a domestic criminal matter.
b.

The Recognition-Enforcement Merger

In its operation, the excise tax on alcohol at issue in the Pasquantino cases is largely indistinguishable from a traditional
licensing scheme that allows individuals to participate in activities that the government aims to control and limit without prohibiting outright. Participation in those activities often carries a
price, and in the case of a license or a sin tax, "the State's core
5 By enacting a sales tax on liquor, the
concern is regulatory.""
Canadian government exercised its traditional police powers. 9 In
this light, the difference between enforcing the Canadian tax law
by allowing American courts to hear a civil RICO claim filed by
the Canadian government in Reynolds II (which is indisputably a
violation of the revenue rule) on one hand, and recognizing the
Canadian tax law by allowing an American wire fraud prosecution
arising from an alleged violation of Canadian tax law on the other,
seems very slight indeed.
In an earlier civil action, the Canadian government asserted
injuries against smugglers in an American federal court that were
based on the costs of enforcement and the harm incurred by its
citizenry as a result of the smuggling operation, ° not merely the
lost revenue that would be indicative of the standard tax collection
action barred by the revenue rule. 81 The nature of these damages
belies the claim of the PasquantinoII majority that "merely recognizing" foreign law in American courts will have no practical effect
77. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
78. Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 20 (2000) (emphasis in original).
79. Cf. id. at 23
80. Canada's civil complaint included, inter alia, injuries arising from: (1)
Increased tobacco consumption among its population, especially its youth; (2)
continued tobacco consumption among existing smokers; and (3) monies spent
seeking to stop the smuggling and catch the wrongdoers. Reynolds 1, 103 F. Supp. 2d
134, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
81. "[Lost revenues resulting from the evasion of duties and taxes . . . require
[Canada] to show that the scheme utilizing the ... wire communications to defraud it

out of tax revenue was successful." Id.

216

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

with regard to the de facto enforcement of those laws. 2 In this
way, the Fourth Circuit improperly acts to "give effect to the...
revenue laws of foreign countries" in the precise way contemplated and barred by the United States Supreme Court in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.3
The Canadian government seeks to preserve the health and
welfare of its citizens by discouraging the use of alcohol and
tobacco products. Thus, the motivating concern of the Canadian
legislature that levied sin taxes on such unhealthful products are
primarily designed to deter Canadian citizens from purchasing
and using them. Although the enactment of sin taxes carries the
ancillary benefit of generating revenue, the Canadian government's interest in those financial gains is secondary to the fundamental value that the taxes provide with regard to preserving a
social policy objective of discouraging and reducing alcohol and
tobacco consumption. Taken to its logical extreme, the ultimate
goal of the Canadian government (and the greatest indicator of
the tax regime's success) would occur at the point where the Canadian government received no revenue stream from its collection of
sin taxes.
For American courts to consider the enforcement of foreign
laws to consist of only monetary judgments to recoup revenue lost
as a result of tax evasion schemes is an oversimplification of the
intended operation of the excise law from the Canadian government's perspective. In reality, the difference between recognizing
and enforcing foreign law is not as stark as critics of the revenue
rule would like to believe. Rather, an American court that
"merely" recognizes Canadian revenue law for the purposes of
prosecuting a wire fraud violation gives effect to Canadian tax law
and essentially enforces a Canadian licensing scheme.
Contemporary discourse on the subject has reduced the
debate to a bulky, shapeless form. It is not necessarily the case
that American treatment of foreign laws either "recognizes" or
82. Kathryn Keneally, Column, White Collar Crime: Fourth Circuit Upholds Wire
Fraud Conviction Based on a Scheme to Evade Foreign Tax, 27 CHAMPION 48, 50
(2003).
83. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413 (1964); see also Okla.
ex rel. West v. Gulf, Colo., and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1911)
(refusing to exercise original jurisdiction in a civil action brought by a state
government to enjoin distributors from continuing to distribute alcohol to minors in
violation of state law where exercising federal jurisdiction to issue an injunction
would cause the Supreme Court "to enforce a statute, one of whose controlling objects
is to impose punishment in order to effectuate a public policy") (emphasis added).
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"enforces" foreign law. Rather, it is possible for an American court
to recognize foreign law in such a way that it enforces foreign law
for all practical purposes, by "giving effect" to foreign law. It is a
logical fallacy to insist that American judicial notice of foreign law
must take the form of either recognition or enforcement without
conceding that it may assume both forms simultaneously. The
distinction between the direct enforcement and the indirect
enforcement of (, i.e. "giving effect to," or "effectuating") foreign
revenue laws is ephemeral in practice, and presents the risk of
inconsistent application if the revenue rule is sought to be applied
in a case-by-case basis that is based on an unworkable theoretical
standard.84
c.

Just Because You See It, Doesn't Mean It's There:
Insisting Upon a PartitionBetween Recognition
and Enforcement

Although the argument can be (and has been) made that an
academic distinction exists between the recognition of foreign law
for the purpose of establishing domestic criminal liability and the
direct enforcement of foreign law in domestic courts, it is largely a
distinction without a difference. The Pasquantinocases are not
unusual in that they present a factual situation where foreign law
is simultaneously recognized and enforced in American courts.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the dual nature of the Canadian tax law in PasquantinoIII when it referred to the "indirect"
enforcement of the Canadian law that is concomitant with its
"mere" recognition as a vehicle to establishing criminal liability. 5
As a result, the "mere" recognition of foreign law is often the practical equivalent of enforcing foreign law, and even where the two
are not identical, recognizing foreign law carries an equivalent
threat of interfering with the sovereignty of foreign nations as
enforcing foreign law.
American courts that evaluate foreign law for the purpose of
establishing elements of American criminal violations must be
vigilant to avoid becoming ensnared in the messy business of
interpreting foreign law. The act of recognizing Canadian tax law
84. Boots involved facts and circumstances that could not be considered an action
to "enforce" foreign law by any reasonable standard. Yet, the First Circuit refused to
"recognize" the tax law because it foresaw that a case-by-case, or "country-by-country"
determination of whether an American court was enforcing foreign law on one hand,
or merely recognizing it on the other, was likely to be problematic. United States v.
Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1996).
85. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1778 (2005).
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potentially involves: "inquiry into the motivations of the Canadian
Parliament in passing and/or repealing various... taxes[;] discovery with respect to Canadian officials and law enforcement personnel[;] and the determination of the credibility of Canadian
officials." 6 Inquiry into these sensitive realms of Canadian sovereignty is intrusive, and one that the Canadian government (and
the majority of foreign jurisdictions) is unlikely to expect, since
the revenue rule has been construed broadly by the Canadian legislature and courts.8 7 Specifically, the Canadian government manifested an intent to be bound by bilateral treaties8 8 for tax
enforcement assistance and statutes requiring reciprocity 9 for the
regulation of cross-border smuggling. It has never similarly signaled its approval of unilateral United States prosecution of individuals attempting to evade Canadian taxes.
Moreover, it is paternalistic to conclude that the Canadian
government will always eagerly submit to American efforts to
enforce its tax laws. First, the impression that the Canadian government relies on American intervention to prosecute Canadian
tax law violations could adversely affect Canada's standing in the
eyes of other foreign nations, which may perceive Canada's inability to enforce its own laws as a sign of weakness. Furthermore, it
is not beyond the realm of possibility that the Canadian government enacted a tax on liquor to appease a morality-based interest
group, while reaching a sensitive understanding with a powerful
lobbying group representing domestic alcohol producers that the
tax would not be stringently enforced. This is but a simple example of the types of political conflicts that are easily implicated in
cases where American courts ignore the revenue rule and pass
judgements bearing on the functioning of foreign regulatory programs. Also, judgements rendered in American courts regarding
Canadian law may create unforeseeable preclusive effects that
bind Canadian courts to new common law precedent and foster
claims of collateral estoppel and resjudicatathat are unattractive
to the Canadian government, which deserves the unfettered right
86. Reynolds I, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
87. See United States v. Harden, [19631 S.C.R. 366, 371 (Can.) (explaining that the
revenue rule is still vigorous in this country in spite of the modem spirit of
international co-operation in the field of taxation and that "foreign states cannot
directly or indirectly enforce their tax claims [in Canadian courts]" (citing
Government of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 515)) (emphasis added).
88. See Protocol Amending Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, Sept. 26, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-4, 2030 U.N.T.S. 236, Art. 15, $ 2.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 546 (2005).
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to exercise its sovereign authority without foreign interference.
Finally, at the practical level, it is possible that the Canadian government's ability to vindicate its lost tax revenue in Canadian
court may be threatened if the defendants are financially handicapped or incarcerated by virtue criminal judgements imposed by
American courts based on their violations of the wire fraud
statute.
The Canadian tax law that the Pasquantinos sought to evade
bears a unique relationship to the American wire fraud statute
that cannot be effectively prosecuted without it. The Canadian
government has chosen to abolish imprisonment as a penalty for
the non-payment of debt,90 and may perceive a prison sentence
imposed on the Pasquantinos (by virtue of their violation of the
wire fraud statute) 91 as a penalty imposed based on their non-payment of Canadian revenue tax. At a time when international
scorn arising from the widespread sense of American arrogance in
world affairs is at a high level, it is injudicious to ignore the revenue rule and use American courts to interpret foreign law as a
subversive means of asserting American policies that are potentially unwelcome in foreign legal systems.
4.

The Rule of Lenity: Giving Effect to Legislative Intent
and Foreign Expectations

In order to pursue the criminal prosecution against the Pasquantinos for their violation of the wire fraud statute, American
courts are forced to contend with existing statutes and treaties
that sometimes conflict with each other. The rule of lenity
instructs courts to enforce the less severe of two conflicting criminal statutes absent clear legislative direction to the contrary. 92 In
United States v. Boots, an earlier case involving facts similar to
those in the Pasquantinocases, a majority of the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit noted the "inherent tensions" 93 that prohibited it from giving meaning to the anti-smuggling statute94 and
the wire fraud statute simultaneously.95 In this context, the rule
90. See Parent v. Perreault, [1979] C.A. 237.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 ("[Violators] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years . .

").

92. See PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1787 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987); Fasulo v. United
States, 272 U.S. 620 (1926).
93. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1996).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 546 (2005); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2002).
95. Kathryn Keneally, The U.S. Prosecutes Foreign Tax Evasion as a Domestic
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of lenity serves a dual purpose. First, it signals the Legislature's
intent to manage issues related to transnational smuggling and
tax assistance by reaching bilateral and multilateral agreements
with foreign nations, rather than resorting to the utilization of
American criminal law.96 Second, it protects the expectations of
foreign nations that have entered into bilateral and multilateral
agreements with the United States by ensuring that the narrow
scope of those instruments are not superceded by unilateral judgements in American courts. The difficulty that the Boots court
encountered while attempting to assess the proper scope of the
wire fraud statute in light of the anti-smuggling statute should
have presented an equally vexing problem to the Fourth Circuit as
well as the Supreme Court, and should have resulted in the same
conclusion.
The Supreme Court addresses the problem of conflicting statutory instruction that was raised in Justice Ginsburg's dissent,
but summarily dismisses the argument by proclaiming that "[t]he
Federal Criminal Code is replete with provisions that criminalize
overlapping conduct," and concluding that existing statutes and
treaties do not occupy the field to the exclusion of the wire fraud
statute.9 7 However, this is not an ordinary case of overlapping
domestic laws. First, the fact that the wire fraud statute primarily concerns issues of foreign law raises the potential that American courts will struggle to resolve conflicts between international
treaties, foreign tax law, and domestic criminal law that do not
arise when overlapping occurs between two familiar domestic
laws. Second, the existence of a bilateral tax treaty suggests that
the United States and Canadian governments sought: 1) to be
responsible for foreign tax collection only to the extent that its
partner was obligated to do the same; 2) to assure that tax law
was interpreted according to the courts of the aggrieved nation;
and 3) to ensure that the courts of one nation did not trample the
sovereignty of the other. Mutual treaties also provide a framework for shared understandings and interpretations of laws
between sovereigns, a feature unique to cross-border cases like
Pasquantino,but not applicable with regard to overlaps in typical
domestic laws. Finally, Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court in
Crime-With FarReaching Consequences, 88 J. TAX'N 224, 225 (1998) (noting that the
court was faced with a decision "between a broad reading of the wire fraud statute on
one side, and the revenue rule and the reciprocity element of the anti-smuggling
statute on the other side").
96. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
97. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. at 1773 n.4.
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Pasquantinogenerally minimizes how vexatious foreign law can
be. His claim that "[iforeign law... posed no unmanageable complexity in this case""s is disingenuous because the Government
and the District Court "made no serious attempt to [address relevant Canadian law]" beyond the testimony of a single witness.9 9
Justice Thomas goes on to say that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 sets "forth a procedure for interpreting foreign law"
and describes those "procedures" as including the admission of
"any relevant material." 100 Somehow, the irony of describing a
particular "procedure" by referring to a complete lack of procedure
escaped four other Supreme Court Justices who joined his opinion.
To convict the Pasquantinos under the federal wire fraud
statute for a scheme to evade foreign taxes, the wire fraud statute
must be read so broadly as to swallow existing tax treaties and the
anti-smuggling statute, which were specifically designed to be
narrowly tailored.'0 ' In response, Justice Thomas cites Justice
Stevens's dissent in United States v. Wells °2 in support of the proposition that "the mere fact that two federal criminal statutes...
03
criminalize similar conduct says little about the scope of either.""
However, Justice Stevens's opinion in Wells is inapposite because
the issue in that case was whether the materiality of a false statement constituted an element of a particular criminal statute.' It
was already established that the defendants' behavior in Wells
violated some American laws, and the question was whether the
jury properly considered materiality as an element of the crime.' 5
Pasquantino,however, is a case of whether defendants' behavior
fell into any class of activity within the purview of American
courts at all. It is one thing to question whether, out of "at least
100 federal false statement statutes," the fact that 42 contain an
express materiality requirement shines any light on the scope of
one particular criminal false statement charge, as was the case in
Wells. °6 It is another thing entirely to examine two carefully
crafted documents regarding a particular species of international
98. Id. at 1780.
99. Id. at 1784 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1780.
101. See Protocol Amending Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, U.S.-Can., Art. 15, 2, Sept. 26, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-4; 18 U.S.C.
§ 546.
102. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 505-509 (1997).
103. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. at 1773 n.4.
104. See Wells, 519 U.S. 482.
105. Id. at 490.
106. Id. at 505.
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conflict - a bilateral tax treaty0 7 and a bilateral anti-smuggling
statute'0 8 - that tilt in favor of lenity in a particular case and
then declare that their existence "says little about the scope"109 of
the third.

III.

THE WIRE FRAUD STATUTE

The Pasquantinocases are compelling because they impel an
examination of the wire fraud statute that illuminates the necessity of applying limiting principles, of which the revenue rule is
the most significant, to constrain the natural propensity of prosecutors and American courts to pass on foreign law.
A.

To Deprive a Phrase of Meaning: "A Scheme to
Defraud"

The wire fraud statute is an attractive tool for prosecutors,
because it ostensibly shifts the focus away from the foreign law
that lies at the heart of the matter and requires the prosecutor to
prove only: 1) that the defendant "intended to devise any scheme
or artifice to defraud"; and 2) the transmission of interstate communication "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice."110 But, "[a] scheme to deceive, however dishonest the
methods employed, is not a scheme to defraud in the absence of a
property right."'
Thus, in United States v. Pierce, the Second
Circuit concluded, "without evidence that Canada imposes duty on
imported liquor in the first place, the government cannot prove a
scheme to defraud the Canadian government because there is no
evidence whatsoever of a property right - a right to revenue - of
2
which the Canadian government could be defrauded.""
The majority of the Fourth Circuit concluded in Pasquantino
II that the "prosecution seeks only to enforce the federal wire
fraud statute for the singular goal of vindicating our government's
substantial interest in preventing our nation's interstate wire
communication systems from being used in furtherance of crimi107. Protocol Amending Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, U.S.-Can., Art. 15, 2, Sept. 26, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-4.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 546.
109. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1773 n.4 (2005).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2002).
111. United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987) (stating that since the passage of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346, the "property right" includes the "intangible right to honest services").
112. Id. at 166-67.
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nal fraudulent enterprises."113 Similarly, a majority of the
Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion that the wire fraud
statute "embodies the policy choice [of the government] to free the
interstate wires from fraudulent use, irrespective of the object of
the fraud."" 4 Neither statement is accurate, and each engages in
its own variation of misdirection.
While the Supreme Court correctly identifies the first element
of a wire fraud violation - fraudulent use of interstate wires - it

neglects to acknowledge the fact that such improper use of interstate wires is only criminal when it occurs in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud. By leaving out the second of two elements in
the criminal statute, the Supreme Court essentially outlaws all
acts of "interstate lying" that occur over public phone lines.
The Fourth Circuit makes a similar, but more devious error.
It fails to define a method of determining what constitutes a
"criminal enterprise" as it relates to foreign tax law. While the
court in United States v. Trapilo tries to expand the reach of the
wire fraud statute from the bench by declaring that "[t]he term
'scheme to defraud' is measured by a 'nontechnical standard," 5 it
neglects to mention that the standard to prove the defendants'
"intent to defraud" is not so fluid. And, in fact, it is not. Until the
Legislature sees fit to make a change, courts that adjudicate criminal cases predicated on the wire fraud statute's criminalization of
communication intended to defraud foreign governments of tax
revenue will inevitably face a catch-22 that will prevent them
from enforcing violations of the wire fraud statute that are based
solely on violations of foreign revenue laws. Before convicting
defendants seeking to evade foreign taxes under the wire fraud
statute, an American court must determine that the defendants'
actions constituted "a scheme or artifice to defraud" and that
defendants "intended" to engage in such a fraud or artifice. But,
before it can do any of those things, the court must first find that
the Canadian government had a property right in the accrued tax
revenue that defendants sought to evade.
To arrive at the conclusion that the Canadian government
had a property right in the accrued tax revenue, an American
court must examine Canadian law to determine the "existence" of
the law, which is "inherently and inescapably tied to recognizing
113. Pasquantino11, 336 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2003).
114. PasquantinoIII, 125 S. Ct. at 1780.
115. United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 550 (2d Cir. 1997).
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the "validity and scope of that law,"116 with all the trappings of
interference with national sovereignty that such an exercise necessarily entails.1 17 Because this is an unattractive and unfeasible
option, the only alternative left open to the court involves making
a summary decision on the basis of prosecution testimony alone
that the Canadian tax law exists. Pierce foreclosed this alternative, indicating that "a juror could not infer the existence of a
Canadian tax or duty from the defendants' suspicious behavior
alone,"1 and while the "liquor may very well have been illegally
imported,. . that does not establish that Canadian tax was due
...."19 To convict defendants under the wire fraud statute for the
evasion of foreign taxes a court must either: 1) deprive defendants
of a proper opportunity to mount a defense of legal impossibility 2 °
(an absurd proposition, resulting in greater protection in American courts for defendants accused of violating domestic tax laws
than foreign tax laws);'2 1 or 2) commence down the treacherous
22
path of interpreting foreign tax law.
Assuming arguendothat a court could presume a defendant's
criminal intent on the basis of his suspicious activity alone, without requiring an examination of the property right he is alleged to
have deprived the victim, applying the wire fraud statute in such
a way that a scheme to defraud a foreign government would serve
as a valid predicate for the "fraud" contemplated by the statute
would most likely extend beyond the reach that Congress intended
to provide. Unlike Reynolds II, which was a civil action brought
under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) and predicated upon a violation of the wire fraud stat116. PasquantinoI, 305 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).
117. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
118. United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2000).
119. Id. at 167.
120. Id. at 166 ("If no Canadian duty or tax actually existed, the Pierces were no
more guilty of wire fraud than they would have been had they used the wires in
furtherance of a scheme surreptitiously to transport liquor down the Hudson River
from Yonkers into New York City ... in the sincere but mistaken belief that New
York City imposes a duty on such cross-border shipments."). Surprisingly, suspicious
behavior suffices as a waiver of a legal impossibility defense in PasquantinoII: "The
fact that [a defendant] abandoned the liquor laden rental truck after detecting
surveillance .. .is strong evidence of his criminal intent. The same goes for his
evasive driving maneuvers." Pasquantino11, 336 F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir. 2003).
121. See Keneally, supra note 95, at 228 (citing Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492
(1943); United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)) (explaining
that the cumulative and extensive tax code preempted the field, leaving no room for
the application of the mail fraud statute to apply to tax evasion without violating
legislative intent).
122. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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ute,'12 free-standing wire fraud actions were never intended to
turn victims into "private attorneys general" 124 as a response to
the particular difficulties associated with combating organized
crime. 125 Instead, the precursor to the modern wire fraud statute
reveals a legislative intent that is useful in a contemporary setting as a means of controlling the reach of American courts to
enforce foreign tax law.
B.

To Cast a Law from its Moorings: The Wire Fraud
Statute

The wire fraud statute has an indispensable legislative historical foundation to guide and limit courts' interpretation of the
wire fraud statute. By holding that the wire fraud statute covers
a foreign tax evasion scheme, like the one undertaken by the Pasquantinos, American courts have exposed their willingness to
ignore the historical underpinnings that should give shape and
structure to the wire fraud statute in its present form.
To be sure, application of the modern wire fraud statute is not
expressly limited to the types of crimes listed in the early incarnation of the mail fraud statute, including "the 'sawdust swindle'...
or dealing or pretending to deal in what is commonly called 'green
articles,' 'green coin,' [or] 'spurious Treasury notes' . .".., This
predecessor of the mail fraud statute, like its contemporary
cousin, the wire fraud statute, contains expansive language that is
designed to address a particular species of crime. The court in
United States v. Henderson describes the aim of the statute as a
means to "protect the public, more precisely, the gullible public,
against the various fraudulent schemes that the cunning of the
trickster could devise."1 27 Though Justice Thomas's majority opinion in PasquantinoIII identifies the objective of the wire fraud
statute as an effort to "free the interstate wires from fraudulent
use,"'128 his definition of the governmental aim is too broad. A
more historically accurate description of the wire fraud statute's
purpose would limit its application to protect a vulnerable public
from harm that is furthered by the use of interstate wires. There
is nothing in Justice Thomas's discussion to suggest that prosecut123. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2005).
124. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000).
125. See Farnam, supra note 56.
126. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 323, 25 Stat. 873 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(2004)).
127. United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048, 1052-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
128. PasquantinoIII, 125 S.Ct. 1766, 1780 (2005).
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ing an out-of-state college student for lying to his mother about his
whereabouts over the phone would stretch the meaning of the
wire fraud statute, despite the fact that such a construction is
clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.
1.

The Wire Fraud Statute as a "Stop-Gap Device"

The American legal machinery has a powerful tool in the wire
fraud statute that allows its prosecutors greater power to frustrate the efforts of creative criminals who are capable of harming
an innocent public by engaging in schemes that do not violate any
existing statutory law. The wire fraud statute functions properly
as an analogue to the temporary injunction - a "stop-gap
device" 129 to stop or slow destructive behavior until the legislature
can overcome its institutional inertia to address the evil by enacting more narrowly tailored legislation.
In Henderson, the court refused to apply the mail fraud statute to prosecute a scheme to avoid domestic federal income taxes
because legislation addressing the defendant's crime already
existed. Similarly, the existence of a bilateral tax treaty providing
for tax enforcement assistance 3 ° and a reciprocal anti-smuggling
statute"' should indicate to American courts that Congress has
addressed the criminal activity at issue in the Pasquantinocases,
and therefore eliminated the need to use the powerful wire fraud
statute that is intended "as a first line of defense" against a "'new'
fraud.' 3 2 To apply the wire fraud statute to the time-worn scheme
executed by the Pasquantinos in an effort to evade foreign excise
taxes stretches the original objective of the statute beyond recognition and logic.'33
129. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. at 1053.
130. See Protocol Amending Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, U.S.-Can., Art. 15, 2, Sept. 26, 1980, S.TREATY Doc. No. 104-4.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 546.
132. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
133. For example, the wire fraud statute might serve as the only deterrent to a
computer hacker contemplating a novel scheme, with the belief that the Internet is
not as substantially regulated as other public forums. While a wire fraud statute
with an expanded reach can be reasonably expected to inspire the contemplative
computer hacker to alter his deceitful behavior, it is difficult to imagine that the
threat of being prosecuted under the wire fraud statute (to the extent that they were
aware of the statute at all) would have altered the Pasquantinos resolve to evade
Canadian taxes, a scheme that the defendants surely anticipated would involve the
violation of well-established Canadian law.

2005]
2.

THE PASQUANTINO PLEA

227

The Wire Fraud Statute as a Shield to Protect the
Ordinary Victim

The second significant (and related) rationale that justifies
the expansive breadth of the wire fraud statute, while providing
an inherent limitation, is its goal of protecting innocent victims
from clever scam artists. In order for the statute to function properly, it must be sufficiently flexible and adaptable to protect the
helpless every-man who generally does not enjoy the benefit of an
aegis of resources which would allow him to withstand creative
schemes designed to swindle him out of money. Waiting for the
Legislature to criminalize novel fraudulent schemes would be
financially disastrous for the average citizen-victim.
In denying Canada's civil RICO action, the court in Reynolds
II distinguished the damages that Congress envisioned awarding
to private victims of fraudulent schemes from the damages that
Canada claimed. The Second Circuit concluded that Canada's
petition for relief was essentially "an indirect attempt to have a
United States court enforce Canadian revenue laws," an inappropriate result because "foreign sovereigns, unlike individuals, have
at their disposal state-funded and state-maintained resources."134
The wire fraud statute is intended to protect the general public by criminalizing harmful behavior that would otherwise go
unchecked as a result of the difficulty that individual American
citizens would encounter in overcoming the constraints of organizing collective action. 3 A properly pled RICO claim presents a
stronger argument in favor of a broad reading of the wire fraud
statute because there is a clear and likely danger that the organized racketeering activity targeted by RICO will result in direct
harm to American interests.

3

However, the Pasquantino cases

are merely free-standing wire fraud actions based on an intended
scheme to evade foreign taxes, which do not implicate any of the
interests in favor of applying such an expansive interpretation of
the statute as the majority concludes. The Fourth Circuit and
United States Supreme Court decisions are outwardly represented as resting on the American government's sovereign interest in protecting this nation's telephone wires from improper
use. 37 While that conclusion finds legal support on a formalistic
134. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d 103, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing MAX WEBER, THE
& ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1947)).
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135. See United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

136. Reynolds 1, 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
137. Pasquantino11, 336 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2003).
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level, 131 it leads to inconsistent results in practice. On the one
hand, American courts have displayed a willingness to use the
revenue rule to bar thinly veiled claims for tax enforcement assistance when foreign governments initiate civil RICO actions in
American courts. On the other hand, American courts contravene
the revenue rule by refusing to look beyond illusory criminal wire
fraud claims to discover the significant foreign interests that are
at stake when the wire fraud statute is manipulated to enforce
foreign tax law by punishing smugglers and deterring future
smuggling operations. It is simply a misstatement of facts to conclude that American courts will be unable to identify which cases
have, at their core, a natural tendency to implicate substantive
domestic interests. Although precedent is clear that "the identity
and location of the victim ... are irrelevant,"1 39 the history of the
statute, its objectives, and its interaction with contextual materials suggests otherwise, because Congress surely did not intend to
give the judiciary a blank check to create criminal liability for
every defendant who uses a phone, regardless of whether there
exist more appropriate avenues of relief and regardless of the
United States' interests at stake.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The wire fraud statute is an effective prosecutorial tool that
will only grow in significance as the pace of global technology and
communication accelerate, leaving broad swaths of uncultivated
legal terrain. However, for the statute to function effectively and
justly, it must be anchored to identifiable principles. The statute
must be wielded judiciously to avoid harming short- and long-term
American interests by swallowing legislation and treaties that are
more closely tailored to the criminal conduct at hand; by straining
judicial resources and international goodwill by removing foreign
tax cases from appropriate foreign courts to American criminal
138. See, e.g., United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[Als the
statute plainly states, what is proscribed is use of the telecommunication systems of
the United States in furtherance of a scheme ....

"); United States v. DeFiore, 720

F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Its focus is upon the misuse of wires.").
139. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552. Similar language appears throughout the literature
on the revenue rule and illustrates the proclivity of some judges and authors to
collapse 1) the determination whether the scheme to defraud was successful (which is
irrelevant), and 2) the determination of whether a property right existed in the first
place (which is relevant and an essential element to the government's case), into a
single analysis. See also supra notes 116-125 and accompanying text.
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courts; or by depriving defendants the opportunity to present
essential defenses.
It may be viscerally satisfying to utilize the wire fraud statute
to punish all criminals, whether they break foreign or domestic
law; to the extent that the Pasquantinos' scheme succeeded in
depriving the Canadian government of tax revenue, they deserve
to be sanctioned. However, Canadian judges are better-positioned
to achieve that objective than their American counterparts. While
complete tax enforcement assistance with Canada is a laudable
goal, it is wise to continue on the path of bilateral treaties, reciprocal statutes and extradition assistance to ensure the fair and consistent interpretation of law and the preservation of the principles
that inhere in international comity and domestic justice.

